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Abstract
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in combinatorial
auctions with subadditive bidders. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan,
and Oren [9] as the following simple market scenario: m items are to be allocated among n
bidders in a distributed setting where bidders valuations are private and hence communication
is needed to obtain an efficient allocation. The communication happens in rounds: in each
round, each bidder, simultaneously with others, broadcasts a message to all parties involved.
At the end, the central planner computes an allocation solely based on the communicated
messages. Dobzinski et al. [9] showed that (at least some) interaction is necessary for obtaining
any efficient allocation: no non-interactive (1-round) protocol with polynomial communication
(in the number of items and bidders) can achieve approximation ratio better than Ω(m1/4),
while for any r ≥ 1, there exists r-round protocols that achieve O˜(r · m1/r+1) approximation
with polynomial communication; in particular, O(logm) rounds of interaction suffice to obtain
an (almost) efficient allocation, i.e., a polylog(m)-approximation.
A natural question at this point is to identify the “right” level of interaction (i.e., number of
rounds) necessary to obtain an efficient allocation. In this paper, we resolve this question by
providing an almost tight round-approximation tradeoff for this problem: we show that for any
r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol that uses poly(m,n) bits of communication can only approximate
the social welfare up to a factor of Ω(1r ·m1/2r+1). This in particular implies that Ω( logmlog logm)
rounds of interaction are necessary for obtaining any efficient allocation (i.e., a constant or
even a polylog(m)-approximation) in these markets. Our work builds on the recent multi-party
round-elimination technique of Alon, Nisan, Raz, and Weinstein [2] – used to prove similar-in-
spirit lower bounds for round-approximation tradeoff in unit-demand (matching) markets – and
settles an open question posed by Dobzinski et al. [9] and Alon et al. [2].
∗Supported in part by National Science Foundation grants CCF-1552909, CCF-1617851, and IIS-1447470.
1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, m items in M are to be allocated between n bidders (or players1) in N
with valuation functions vi : 2
M → R+. The goal is to find a collection of disjoint bundles A1, . . . , An
of items inM (an allocation), that maximizes social welfare defined as the sum of bidder’s valuations
for the allocated bundles, i.e.,
∑
i∈N vi(Ai). This paper studies the tradeoff between the amount of
interaction between the bidders and the efficiency of the allocation in combinatorial auctions.
In our model, each bidder i ∈ N only knows the valuation function vi and hence the bidders
need to communicate to obtain an efficient allocation. Communication happens in rounds. In each
round, each bidder i, simultaneously with others, broadcasts a message to all parties involved, based
on the valuation function vi and messages in previous rounds. In the last round, the central planner
outputs the allocation solely based on the communicated messages. Notice that a “trivial solution”
in this setting is for all players to communicate their entire input to the central planner who can
then compute an efficient allocation; however, such a protocol is clearly infeasible in most settings
as it has an enormous communication cost. As such, we are interested in protocols with significantly
less communication cost, typically exponentially smaller than the input size.
This model was first introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren [9] to address the following fun-
damental question in economics: “To what extent is interaction between individuals required in order
to efficiently allocate resources between themselves?”. They considered this problem for two different
classes of valuation functions: unit-demand valuations and subadditive valuations (see Section 2.1).
For both settings, they showed that (at least some) interaction is necessary to obtain an efficient
allocation: non-interactive (aka 1-round or simultaneous) protocols have enormous communication
cost compared to interactive ones, while even allowing a modest amount of interaction allows for
finding an (approximately) efficient allocation. We now elaborate more on these results.
For the case of matching markets with n unit-demand bidders and n items (and hence input-size
of n bits per each player), Dobzinski et al. [9] proved a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the approximation
ratio of any simultaneous protocol that communicates no(1) bits per each bidder. On the other
hand, they showed that for any r ≥ 1, there exists an r-round protocol that achieves an O(n1/r+1)
approximation by sending O(log n) bits per each bidder in each round. For the more general setting
of combinatorial auctions with n subadditive bidders and m items (and hence input-size of exp(m)
bits per each player), they showed that the best approximation ratio achievable by simultaneous
protocols with poly(m,n) communication is Ω(m1/4), while for any r ≥ 1, there exists r-round
protocols that achieve an approximation ratio of O˜(r ·m1/r+1). These results imply that in such
markets, logarithmic rounds of interaction in the market size suffice to obtain an (almost) efficient
allocation, i.e., a polylog(m)-approximation.
A natural question left open by [9] was to identify the amount of interaction necessary to obtain
an efficient allocation in these markets. Recently, Alon, Nisan, Raz, and Weinstein [2] provided
a partial answer to this question for matching markets: for any r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol for
unit-demand bidders in which each bidder sends at most no(1) bits in each round can only achieve
an Ω(n1/5
r+1
) approximation [2]. This implies that at least Ω(log log n) rounds of interaction is
necessary to achieve an efficient allocation in matching markets. Alon et al. [2] further conjectured
that the “correct” lower bound for the convergence rate in this setting is Ω(log n); in other words,
Ω(log n) rounds of interaction are necessary for achieving an efficient allocation.
Despite this progress for matching markets, the best known lower bounds for the more gen-
eral setup of combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders remained the aforementioned 1-round
lower bound of [9], and a (2 − ε)-approximation (for every constant ε > 0) for any polynomial
1Throughout the paper, we use the terms “bidder” and “player” interchangeably.
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communication protocol with unrestricted number of rounds [10]. Indeed, obtaining better lower
bounds for r-round protocols was posed as an open problem by Alon et al. [2] who also mentioned
that: “from a communication complexity perspective, lower bounds in this setup are more com-
pelling, since player valuations require exponentially many bits to encode, hence interaction has the
potential to reduce the overall communication from exponential to polynomial.”.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we resolve the aforementioned open question of Dobzinski et al. [9] and Alon et al. [2]
by proving an almost tight round-approximation tradeoff for polynomial communication protocols
in subadditive combinatorial auctions.
Main Result. For any r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol (deterministic or randomized) for combina-
torial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication can only achieve
an approximation ratio of Ω(1r ·m1/Θ(r)) to the social welfare.
We remark that this lower bound holds even when the bidders valuations are XOS functions, a
strict subclass of subadditive valuations (see Section 2.1 for definition).
Our main result, combined with the upper bound result of [9], provides a near-complete un-
derstanding of the power of each additional round in improving the quality of the allocation in
subadditive combinatorial auctions. Moreover, an immediate corollary of our result is that in these
markets, Ω( logmlog logm) rounds of interaction are necessary to achieve any efficient allocation (i.e., con-
stant or polylogarithmic approximation), which is tight up to an O(log logm) factor. The qualitative
message of this theoretical result is clear: a modest amount of interaction between individuals in a
market is crucial for obtaining an efficient allocation.
Our first step in establishing this result is proving a new lower bound for simultaneous (1-
round) protocols. We deviate from [9] by considering the problem of estimating the value of social
welfare as opposed to finding the actual allocation; this problem can only be harder in terms of
proving a lower bound as any protocol that can find an approximate allocation can also be used to
estimate the value of social welfare with one additional round and O(n) additional communication
using a trivial reduction (see Section 2.2). As a result, the kind of combinatorial arguments used
in [9] seem not sufficient for our purpose and we instead prove our lower bound using information-
theoretic machinery and in particular a direct-sum style argument. This counterintuitive switch to
establishing a lower bound for a seemingly harder problem however leads to a more modular proof
that allows us to further carry out our results to multi-round protocols.
We establish our multi-round lower bound following the multi-party round-elimination technique
of Alon et al. [2]. We create a recursive family of hard distributions D1,D2, . . . whereby for any
r ≥ 1, Dr is the hard input distribution for r-round protocols. Each instance in Dr is a careful
combination of exponentially many sub-instances sampled from Dr−1. One of these sub-instances is
“special” in that to solve the original instance, the players also need to solve this special sub-instance
completely. On the other hand, the players are not able to identify this special sub-instance locally
and hence need to spend one round of interaction only for this purpose. In other words, we prove
that the first round of protocol does not convey much information about the special instance beyond
its identity. Using a further round-elimination argument, we inductively show that since solving the
special instance is hard for (r− 1)-round protocols, solving the original instance should be hard for
r-round protocols as well.
Similar to [2], and unlike typical two-player round-elimination arguments (see, e.g. [23, 27]),
eliminating a round in our round-elimination argument requires a reduction from “low dimensional”
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instances (with fewer players and items) to “high dimensional” instances. This reduction is delicate
as the players need to “complete” their inputs in the higher dimensional instance by independently
sampling the “missing part” conditioned on the first message of the protocol without any further
communication, while this distribution is a correlated distribution.
Furthermore, in contrast to [2], our sub-instances in each distribution are overlapping (as oth-
erwise exponentially many sub-instances cannot be embedded inside a single polynomially larger
instance) and hence may interfere with each other, potentially diminishing the role of the special
instance. We overcome this obstacle by embedding these sub-instances based on a family of small-
intersection sets to limit the potential overlap between the sub-instances and prove that solving the
special instance is crucial even in the presence of these overlaps. It is worth pointing out that this
approach allows us to avoid the doubly-exponential rate of growth in the size of instances across
different rounds in [2], resulting in exponentially better dependence on the parameter r in our lower
bound compared to [2]. Finally, since our lower bound is for estimating the value of social welfare
(as opposed to finding an allocation), we need a different embedding argument in our reduction
than the one used in [2]2. In particular, we now embed the low dimensional instance in multiple
places of the high dimensional instance as opposed to only one.
1.2 Other Related Work
Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions has received quite a lot of attention in the
literature. It is known that for arbitrary valuations, exponential amount of communication is needed
to obtain an
(
m1/2−ε
)
-approximate allocation (for every constant ε > 0) [25] (see also [24]), and this
is also tight [1, 7, 20, 22]. For subadditive valuations, a constant factor approximation to the social
welfare can be achieved in our model using only polynomial communication [10, 11, 14–16, 21, 28]
(and polynomially many rounds of interaction); in particular, Feige [15] developed a 2-approximation
polynomial communication protocol for this problem and Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [10] proved
that obtaining (2− ε)-approximation (for any constant ε > 0) requires exponential communication
(regardless of the number of rounds). Moreover, Dutting and Kesselheim [14] designed an O(logm)-
approximation protocol with polynomial communication for subadditive combinatorial auctions in
which each bidder needs to communicate exactly once; however, this protocol still requires n rounds
of interaction in our model as the players need to communicate in a round-robin fashion making the
message sent by a bidder crucially depending on the messages communicated earlier by the previous
bidders.
Another line of relevant research considers the case where the valuation of the bidders are chosen
independently from a commonly known distribution (see, e.g. [17, 18]) and aims to design “simple”
and simultaneous protocols that achieve an efficient allocation. The main difference between this
setting and ours is that we are interested in arbitrary distributions of inputs for the bidders which
are not necessarily product distributions; as already shown by the strong impossibility results of [9],
the aforementioned type of protocols cannot provably exist in our model when input distributions
are correalted. Finally, we point out that “incompressability” results are also known for subad-
ditive valuations: any polynomial-length encoding of subadditive valuations must lose Ω(
√
m) in
precision [4, 5].
We refer the interested reader to [9] for a comprehensive summary of related work and further
discussion on the role of interaction in markets.
2Our problem corresponds to the problem of estimating the size of a maximum matching as opposed to finding
an approximate matching in the setting of [2]. To the best of our knowledge, no non-trivial lower bounds are known
for the matching size estimation problem in the setting of [2]; see [3] for further details.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. For any integer a ≥ 1, we let [a] := {1, . . . , a}. We say that a set S ⊆ [n] with |S| = s
is a s-subset of [n]. For a k-dimensional tuple X = (X1, . . . ,Xk) and index i ∈ [k], we define
X<i := (X1, . . . ,Xi−1) and X
−i := (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xk). We use capital letters to denote
random variables. For a random variable A, supp(A) denotes the support of A and dist(A) denotes
its distribution. We further define |A| := log |supp(A)|. We write A ⊥ B | C to denote that A and
B are independent conditioned on C. We use “w.p.” to mean “with probability”.
Concentration bounds. Throughout, we use the following version of Chernoff bound for nega-
tively correlated random variables first proved by [26]; see, also [13, 19].
Proposition 2.1 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be negatively correlated random variables tak-
ing values in [0, 1] and let X :=
∑n
i=1Xi. Then, for any α ≥ 2e2,
Pr (X ≥ α · E [X]) ≤ exp (−Ω(α · E [X]))
Intersecting families. The following combinatorial construction plays a crucial role in our proofs.
Definition 1. A (p, q, t, ℓ)-intersecting family F is a collection of p subsets of [q] each of size t,
such that for any two distinct sets S, T ∈ F , |S ∩ T | ≤ ℓ.
We prove the existence of an exponentially large intersecting family with a small pair-wise
intersection, using a probabilistic argument.
Lemma 2.2. For any integer r ≥ 1, any parameter ε > 0, and any integer k ≥ (2e2 · r2) 1ε , there
exists a (p, q, t, ℓ)-intersecting family with p = exp
(
Θ(k2r−2+ε)
)
, q = k2r + r · k2r−1, t = r · k2r−1,
and ℓ = k2r−2+ε.
Proof. Let F be a family of p sets (for p to be determined later), each chosen independently and
uniformly at random from all t-subsets of [q]. Fix any pair of sets S, T ∈ F ; for each element
a ∈ S, define the random variable Xa ∈ {0, 1} which is 1 iff a ∈ T also. We have E [Xa] ≤ r/k.
Let X =
∑
a∈S Xa denotes |S ∩ T |; hence E [X] = r2 · k2r−2. Since Xa’s are negatively correlated
random variables, by Chernoff bound (Proposition 2.1 with α = kε/r2 ≥ 2e2 by lemma statement),
Pr (|S ∩ T | > ℓ) = Pr (X > k2r−2+ε) = Pr (X > kε/r2 · E [X]) ≤ exp (−Ω(k2r−2+ε))
By a union bound over all possible choices for S, T ∈ F ,
Pr (∃ S, T ∈ F : |S ∩ T | > ℓ) ≤
∑
S 6=T∈F
Pr (|S ∩ T | > ℓ) ≤
(
p
2
)
· exp (−Ω(k2r−2+ε))
Taking p = exp
(
Θ(k2r−2+ε)
)
ensures that with some non-zero probability, the set F is a (p, q, t, ℓ)-
intersecting family, implying the existence of such a family.
2.1 Combinatorial Auctions
We have a set N of n bidders, and a set M of m items. Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation function
vi : 2
M → R+, which assigns a value to each bundle of items (we assume vi(∅) = 0 and vi(·) is
non-decreasing). The goal is to maximize the social welfare defined as max(A1,...,An)
∑
i∈N vi(Ai),
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where (A1, . . . , An) ranges over all possible allocations of items in M to bidders in N such that
bidder i receives the bundle Ai.
A valuation function v(·) is considered subadditive iff for any two bundles of items S, T ⊆ M ,
v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ). A valuation function is additive iff for any bundle S ⊆ M , v(S) =∑
j∈S v({j}). A valuation function is XOS iff there exists r additive valuation functions a1, . . . , ar
such that for all bundles S ⊆ M , v(S) = maxr ar(S). Each function aj is called a clause of v and
for any bundle S, any clause a ∈ argmaxr ar(S) is referred to as a maximizing clause of S. Finally,
a valuation function is unit-demand iff for any S ⊆ M , v(S) = maxj∈S v({j}). It is easy to verify
that both XOS and unit-demand functions are also subadditive.
Notice that in general, subadditive and XOS valuation functions require exp(m) many bits for
representation, while unit-demand valuation functions can be represented with O(m) numbers, i.e.,
by describing the value of each singleton set. As such, in subadditive combinatorial auctions, we are
interested in protocols that can reduce the communication from exponential in m to polynomial,
while in unit-demand auctions, we mainly seek protocols that reduce the communication from linear
in m to logarithmic.
2.2 Communication Model
We use the (number-in-hand) multiparty communication model with shared blackboard: there are
n players (corresponding to the bidders) receiving inputs (x1, . . . , xn), jointly distributed according
to a prior distribution D on X1× . . .×Xn. The communication proceeds in rounds whereby in each
round r, the players simultaneously write a message on a shared blackboard visible to all parties.
In a deterministic protocol, the message sent by any player i in each round can only depend on
the private input of the player, i.e., xi, plus the messages of all players in previous rounds, i.e., the
content of the blackboard. In a randomized protocol, we further allow the players to have access to
both public and private randomness and the message of players can depend on them as well.
For a protocol π, we use Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πn) to denote the transcript of the message communicated
by the players (i.e., the content of the blackboard). In addition to the n players, there exists also a
(n+1)-th party called the referee which does not have any input, and is responsible for outputting the
answer in the last round, solely based on content of the blackboard Π (plus the public randomness in
case of randomized protocols). Finally, the communication cost of the protocol π, denoted by ‖π‖,
is the sum of worst-case length of the messages communicated by all players, i.e., ‖π‖ =∑ni=1 |Πi|.
Approximation guarantee. We consider protocols that are required to estimate the maximum
value of social welfare in any instance I of a combinatorial auction (denoted by sw(I)). More
formally, a δ-error α-approximation protocol needs to, for each input instance I sampled from D,
output a number in the range [ 1α · sw(I), sw(I)] w.p. at least 1 − δ, where the randomness is over
the distribution D (and the randomness of protocol in case of randomized protocols).
This problem is provably easier than finding an approximate allocation in the interactive setting:
any r-round protocol for finding an approximate allocation can be used to obtain an (r + 1)-round
protocol for estimating the value of social welfare with O(n) additional communication; simply
compute the approximate allocation in the first r rounds and spend one additional round in which
each player declares her value for the assigned bundle to the referee. It was shown very recently
in [6] that this loss of one round in the reduction is unavoidable (see Section 3 for further details).
However, this extra one round is essentially negligible for our purpose as we are interested in the
asymptotic dependence of the approximation ratio and the number of rounds.
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2.3 Tools from Information Theory
We briefly review some basic definitions and facts from information theory that are used in this pa-
per. We refer the interested reader to the excellent text by Cover and Thomas [8] for an introduction
to this field, and the proofs of the claims in this section (see Chapter 2).
In the following, we denote the Shannon Entropy of a random variable A by H(A) and themutual
information of two random variables A and B by I(A ;B) = H(A) − H(A | B) = H(B) − H(B |
A). We use H2(·) to denote the binary entropy function where for any real number 0 < δ < 1,
H2(δ) := δ log
1
δ +(1− δ) log 11−δ . The proof of the following basic properties of entropy and mutual
information can be found in [8], Chapter 2.
Fact 2.3. Let A, B, and C be three (possibly correlated) random variables.
1. 0 ≤ H(A) ≤ |A|, and H(A) = |A| iff A is uniformly distributed over its support.
2. I(A ;B | C) ≥ 0. The equality holds iff A and B are independent conditioned on C.
3. H(A | B,C) ≤ H(A | B). The equality holds iff A ⊥ C | B.
4. I(A,B ;C) = I(A ;C) + I(B ;C | A) ( chain rule of mutual information).
5. Suppose f(A) is a deterministic function of A, then I(f(A) ;B | C) ≤ I(A ;B | C) ( data
processing inequality).
The following Fano’s inequality states that if a random variable A can be used to estimate the
value of another random variable B, then A should “consume” most of B’s entropy.
Fact 2.4. Let A,B be random variables and f be a function that given A predicts a value for B.
Suppose B is binary and Pr (f(A) 6= B) ≤ δ, then H(B | A) ≤ H2(δ).
We also use the following two simple propositions.
Proposition 2.5. For variables A,B,C,D, if A ⊥ D | C, then, I(A ;B | C) ≤ I(A ;B | C,D).
Proof. Since A and D are independent conditioned on C, by Fact 2.3-(3), H(A | C) = H(A | C,D)
and H(A | C,B) ≥ H(A | C,B,D). We have,
I(A ;B | C) = H(A | C)−H(A | C,B) = H(A | C,D)−H(A | C,B)
≤ H(A | C,D)−H(A | C,B,D) = I(A ;B | C,D)
Proposition 2.6. For variables A,B,C,D, if A ⊥ D | B,C, then, I(A ;B | C) ≥ I(A ;B | C,D).
Proof. Since A ⊥ D | B,C, by Fact 2.3-(3), H(A | B,C) = H(A | B,C,D). Moreover, since
conditioning can only reduce the entropy (again by Fact 2.3-(3)),
I(A ;B | C) = H(A | C)−H(A | B,C) ≥ H(A | D,C)−H(A | B,C)
= H(A | D,C)−H(A | B,C,D) = I(A ;B | C,D)
For two distributions µ and ν over the same probability space, the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between µ and ν is defined as D(µ || ν) := Ea∼µ
[
log
Prµ(a)
Prν(a)
]
. We have,
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Fact 2.7. For random variables A,B,C,
I(A ;B | C) = E
(b,c)∼dist(B,C)
[
D(dist(A|C = c) || dist(A|B = b, C = c))
]
.
We denote the total variation distance between two distributions µ and ν over the same proba-
bility space Ω by ‖µ− ν‖ = 12 ·
∑
x∈Ω |Prµ(x)− Prν(x)|.
The following Pinskers’ inequality bounds the total variation distance between two distributions
based on their KL-divergence,
Fact 2.8 (Pinsker’s inequality). For any two distributions µ and ν, ‖µ− ν‖ ≤
√
1
2 · D(µ || ν).
Fact 2.9. Suppose µ and ν are two distributions for an event E, then, Prµ(E) ≤ Prν(E) + ‖µ− ν‖.
3 Warm Up: A Lower Bound for Simultaneous Protocols
Our main lower bound result is based on analyzing a recursive family of distributions. As a warm
up, we analyze the base case of this recursive construction in this section and prove a lower bound
for 1-round (simultaneous) protocols. Formally,
Theorem 1. For any sufficiently small constant ε > 0, any simultaneous protocol (possibly ran-
domized) for combinatorial auctions with subadditive (even XOS) bidders that can approximate the
value of social welfare to a factor of m
1
3
−ε requires exp
(
mΩ(ε)
)
bits of communication.
It is worth mentioning that the bound established in Theorem 1 on the approximation ratio of
simultaneous protocols is tight. Previously, Dobzinski et al. [9] developed a simultaneous protocol
that can approximate the social welfare up to an O˜(m1/3) factor using only polynomial communi-
cation. As such, Theorem 1 already makes a small contribution for simultaneous protocols. But
more importantly, this theorem sets the stage for our main lower bound result in Section 4.
As pointed out earlier, Dobzinski et al. [9] have previously proved an Ω(m1/4) lower bound on
the approximation ratio of the protocols that can find an approximate allocation. We should remark
that this lower bound of [9] and our lower bound in Theorem 1 are incomparable in that neither imply
(or strengthen) the other. The reason is that while the problem of estimating the social welfare is
provably easier than the problem of finding an approximate allocation, the reduction requires one
additional round of interaction and hence, in general, a simultaneous protocol for the problem of
finding the allocation only implies a 2-round (and not a simultaneous) protocol for the social welfare
estimation problem3. Interestingly, for the case of n = 2 players, Braverman et al. [6] very recently
showed that the problem of estimating the social welfare is indeed provably harder than finding an
approximate allocation for simultaneous protocols. In the light of this result, it seems plausible that
one can indeed improve the protocol of [9] and find an O(m1/4)-approximation protocol for finding
an approximate allocation (matching the lower bound of [9]); however, Theorem 1 suggests that if
such a protocol exists, it necessarily should be oblivious to the welfare of the allocation it provides.
3.1 A Hard Input Distribution for Simultaneous Protocols
In this section, we propose a hard input distribution D1 for simultaneous protocols and state several
of its properties that are needed in proving the lower bound for this distribution. We start by
providing an informal description of the distribution D1.
3Note however that the O˜(m1/3)-approximation protocol of [9] can already compute the welfare of the allocated
allocation and hence does not need an additional round for estimating the social welfare, implying the tightness of
the bounds in Theorem 1.
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Let k be an integer and consider a set N of n = k2 players and M of m = k3 items. Each bidder
i ∈ N , is given an exponentially large (in k) collection Fi of item-sets of size k each, such that for all
S ⊆ M , vi(S) = maxT∈Fi |S ∩ T | (recall that the input to player i is the valuation function vi(·)).
Additionally, the sets in Fi are “barely overlapping”, in the sense that for any two sets S, T ∈ Fi,
|S ∩ T | < kε (for any constant ε > 0).
This construction ensures that locally each player is confronted with exponentially many high
value bundles (sets in Fi) that look “exactly the same”. However, these collections across different
players are chosen in a correlated way such that except for a single “special bundle” Tj ∈ Fi (for
each i ∈ N), the items in all other bundles are chosen (mostly) from a (relatively small) set of k2
“shared” items across all players. The special bundles on the other hand consist of “unique” items.
This imply that globally each player is assigned a special bundle and these special bundles are crucial
to obtaining any k1−ε-approximate allocation (recall that k1−ε = m
1−ε
3 ).
We then use an additional randomization trick to ensure that any instance sampled from D1
either has a “large” social welfare (w.p., say, half) or a “small” one (with the remaining probability):
we drop some of the bundles from the collection Fi of each player i ∈ N randomly (in a correlated
way), to create two sub-distributions whereby in one of them none of the special bundles are dropped
and hence the social welfare is k3, and in the other one all special bundles are dropped and hence
the social welfare is at most k2+ε (k2 for shared items plus kε intersection from any other bundle
(in Fi) for each of the k2 players). This completes the description of our hard distribution. We now
formally define D1.
Distribution D1(N,M). A hard input distribution for simultaneous protocols.
Input: Collections N of n = k2 players and M of m = 2k3 items.
Output: A set of n valuation functions (v1, . . . , vn) for the players in N .
1. Let S = {S1, . . . , Sp} be a (p, q, t, ℓ)-intersecting family with p = exp (Θ(kε)), q = k2 + k,
t = k, and ℓ = kε (guaranteed to exist by Lemma 2.2).
2. Pick j⋆ ∈ [p] and θ ∈ {0, 1} independently and uniformly at random.
3. For each player i ∈ N independently,
(a) Denote by Fi the private collection of player i (used below to define the valuation
function vi), initialized to be a copy of S on the universe [q].
(b) Let xi ∈ {0, 1}p be a p-dimensional vector whereby xi(j⋆) = θ and for any j 6= j⋆,
xi(j) is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
(c) For any j ∈ [p], if xi(j) = 0, remove the set Sj from Fi, and otherwise keep Sj in Fi.
4. Pick a random permutation σ of M . For the i-th player in N , map the j-th item in [q] \Sj⋆
to σ(j). Moreover, map the j-th item in Sj⋆ to σ(k
2 + (i− 1) · k+ j). Under this mapping,
the private collection Fi of player i consists of at most p sets of t = k items from M .
5. For all i ∈ N , define the valuation function of player i as vi(S) = maxT∈Fi |S ∩ T |.
We use D1 to denote the distribution D1(N,M) whenever the sets N and M are clear from the
context (or are irrelevant). We make several observations about the distribution D1.
Observation 3.1. The valuation function of each bidder i ∈ [n] in the distribution D1 is an XOS
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valuation (and hence is also subadditive) whereby each set T ∈ Fi defines a clause in which all items
in T have value 1 and all other items have value 0.
For any player i ∈ N , we define the labeling function φi as the function used to map the items
in [q] to M . Notice that φi is a function of σ and index j
⋆.
Observation 3.2. The input to player i can be uniquely identified by the pair (xi, φi), as xi defines
the private collection Fi over the items [q], and φi specifies the actual labeling of the items in M in
the instance.
We also point out a crucial property of this distribution: each player i ∈ N is oblivious to which
of the sets Sj (for j ∈ [p]), is the set Sj⋆ . More formally,
Observation 3.3. Conditioned on the input (xi, φi) to player i, the index j
⋆ ∈ [p] is chosen uni-
formly at random.
Recall that for an instance I ∼ D1, sw(I) denotes the maximum value of social welfare, i.e.,
sw(I) := max(A1,...,An)
∑
i∈N vi(Ai), where (A1, . . . , An) ranges over all possible allocation of items.
The following lemma establishes a bound on the social welfare of any instance sampled from D1.
Lemma 3.4. For any I ∼ D1, (i) if θ = 1, then sw(I) = k3, and (ii) if θ = 0, then sw(I) ≤ 2k2+ε.
Proof. Suppose first that θ = 1. In this case, xi(j
⋆) = 1 for all bidders i ∈ N , implying that the
set Sj⋆ is not removed from any private collection Fi. Moreover, the mapping σ maps the items in
Sj⋆ to a unique set of items and hence the allocation (A1, . . . , An), whereby Ai is the set of items
σ(k2 + (i− 1) · k + 1) . . . σ(k2 + i · k), results in a welfare of k3 which is clearly maximum.
Now consider the case θ = 0. In this case, xi(j
⋆) = 0 for all bidders i ∈ N , and hence the
set Sj⋆ is missing from all private collections. Recall that items in [q] \ Sj⋆ (across all players) are
mapped to the first k2 items of M (according to the ordering σ). Moreover, by the intersecting
family property of the set S, the intersection of Sj⋆ with any other set in S, and consequently, any
other set in any Fi (for i ∈ N) is at most ℓ = kε items. This means that in any allocation, bidder i
can only “benefit” from at most kε elements in σ(k2+1) . . . σ(k3). Consequently, in this case, sw(I)
is at most k2 (accounting for all the first k2 items of σ) plus k2+ε (accounting for kε benefit from
each of the k2 players).
3.2 The Lower Bound for Distribution D1
Let π be a public coin simultaneous protocol that can output a
(
m
1−ε
3
)
-approximation to the
social welfare of any instance I ∼ D1, w.p. of failure δ ≤ 1/3. In this section, we prove that the
communication cost of the protocol π needs to be at least exp(kΩ(ε)) bits. Note that by (the easy
direction of) Yao’s minimax principle [29], we only need to consider deterministic protocols on the
distribution D1 to prove this result.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. By Lemma 3.4, the social welfare in the given
instance changes by a factor of k1−ε depending on the value of θ. This implies that any k1−ε = m
1−ε
3
approximation algorithm for the social welfare can also determine the value of θ. Using this, we
can argue that the message sent by the players needs to reveal Ω(1) bit of information about the
parameter θ. Roughly speaking, this means that each of the n players is responsible for revealing
Ω(1/n) bit about θ in average.
Furthermore, recall that the input to player i ∈ N can be seen as a tuple (xi, φi) (by Observa-
tion 3.2) and that θ = xi(j
⋆). Additionally, by Observation 3.3, given input (xi, φi) to player i, the
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index j⋆ is chosen uniformly at random from [p] and hence player i is oblivious to which index of
xi corresponds to the parameter θ. This essentially means that player i needs to reveal Ω(p/n) bits
about the vector xi to be able to reveal Ω(1/n) bit about xi(j
⋆), hence forcing i to communicate
Ω(p/n) = exp
(
kΩ(ε)
)
bits also. To make the latter intuition precise, we argue that while the mes-
sage sent by one player can, in principle, be used to infer information about the input of another
player (as the input of the players are correlated), this extra information is limited to an “easy
part”, containing only (σ, j⋆) that can even be assumed to be known to referee (but not players)
beforehand. This allows us to “break” the information revealed to the referee to smaller pieces sent
by each player, hence arguing that each player is indeed directly responsible for communicating the
information about her input. We now formalize this intuition. We first need the following notation.
Notation. We use Π = (Π1, . . . ,Πn) to denote the random variable for the transcript of the
messages communicated in π. For any player i ∈ N , and any j ∈ [p], we use the random variable
Xi,j ∈ {0, 1} to denote the value of xi(j), i.e., Xi,j = 1 iff the set Sj ∈ S is included in the private
collection Fi. We further define Xi for i ∈ N as the vector Xi := (Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,p). We use Σ to
denote the random variable for the permutation σ, J for the index j⋆, and Θ for the parameter θ.
For each player i ∈ N , Φi denotes the random variable for the labeling function φi.
Recall that (Σ, J) is the “easy part” of the input: the part that we assume the referee (but not
each individual player) knows beforehand. Assuming this knowledge can only strengthen our lower
bound. We start by arguing that the protocol π needs to reveal Ω(1) bits of information about the
value of parameter θ in the distribution.
Claim 3.5. I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) = Ω(1).
Proof. By Claim 3.4, the social welfare is k1−ε = m
1−ε
3 times larger when θ = 1 than when θ = 0.
Since π outputs an
(
m
1−ε
3
)
-approximation to the social welfare, it can also be used to distinguish
between the values of θ w.p. of error at most δ ≤ 1/3. This means that there is a function
that given the message Π, and variables (Σ, J) (i.e., the easy part of the input) can determine the
value of Θ w.p. of error at most δ. This, together with Fano’s inequality (Fact 2.4), implies that
H(Θ | Π,Σ, J) ≤ H2(δ) (as |Θ| = 2).
We now have,
H2(δ) ≥ H(Θ | Π,Σ, J) = H(Θ | Σ, J)− I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) = 1− I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J)
where in the final equality we used the fact that in D1, Θ is chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1} independent of (Σ, J), and hence H(Θ | Σ, J) = 1 (by Fact 2.3-(1)). To finalize, we have that
I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) ≥ 1−H2(δ) = Ω(1) as δ is a constant bounded away from 1/2.
We now show that the information revealed about Θ by the message Π is at most the sum of
information revealed by each message Πi for i ∈ N individually. In other words, one does not gain
an extra information by combining the messages of players (after conditioning on what is revealed
by (Σ, J) already).
Claim 3.6. I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) ≤∑i∈N I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J).
Proof. We have,
I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) =
∑
i∈N
I(Θ ;Πi | Π<i,Σ, J) ≤
∑
i∈N
I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J)
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where the equality is by chain rule (Fact 2.3-(4)), and the inequality follows from Proposition 2.6,
as we show below that Πi ⊥ Π<i | Θ,Σ, J , or equivalently I(Πi ; Π<i | Θ,Σ, J) = 0 (by Fact 2.3-(2)).
As stated in Observation 3.2, the input of player i ∈ N is uniquely determined by (xi, φi)
and hence Πi is a deterministic function of variables Xi and Φi. Moreover, Φi is also uniquely
determined by (Σ, J), hence, conditioned on (Σ, J), Πi is only a function of Xi. On the other hand,
conditioned on (Θ,Σ, J), Xi and X
<i are chosen independently of each other in the distribution
D1 (as Xi,j⋆ = θ and the rest of Xi is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}). This implies that
I(Xi ;X
<i | Θ,Σ, J) = 0. As stated earlier, Πi is a function of Xi and Π<i is a function of X<i
alone (conditioned on (Θ,Σ, J)), hence, by data processing inequality (Fact 2.3-(5)), I(Πi ; Π
<i |
Θ,Σ, J) = 0 as well.
We now use a direct-sum style argument to prove that if a player i ∈ N wants to communicate
c bits about θ, she needs to communicate (essentially) p · c bits about her input.
Lemma 3.7. For any i ∈ N , I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J) ≤ |Πi| /p.
Proof. We have,
I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J) = E
j∈[p]
[
I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J = j)
]
= E
j∈[p]
[
I(Xi,j ; Πi | Σ, J = j)
]
(Θ = Xi,j conditioned on J = j)
=
1
p
·
∑
j∈[p]
I(Xi,j ; Πi | Σ, J = j)
(the index j⋆ is chosen uniformly at random from [p])
Define Σ−i as the part of permutation Σ that does not affect the labeling function Φi of player
i, i.e., the values of σ(k2+1) . . . σ(k2+(i−1) ·k) and σ(k2+ i ·k+1), . . . , σ(k3). With this notation,
Σ can be written as a function of Φi, Σ
−i, and J (as J and Φi uniquely define the rest of Σ outside
Σ−i). Consequently, we can write,
I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J) = 1
p
·
∑
j∈[p]
I(Xi,j ; Πi | Σ−i,Φi, J = j)
Our goal is now to drop the conditioning on the event “J = j”. To do so, notice that the
distribution of (Σ−i,Φi) is independent of the event J = j; this is immediate to see as Σ
−i is
independent of Φi and J = j, and Φi is independent of J = j by Observation 3.3. Moreover, Xi,j is
independent of all (Σ−i,Φi, J = j) (as it is uniform over {0, 1}) and furthermore, Πi is a function of
Φi,Xi, which are independent of J = j. Consequently, we can drop the conditioning in the above
information term and obtain that,
I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J) = 1
p
·
∑
j∈[p]
I(Xi,j ; Πi | Σ−i,Φi) ≤ 1
p
·
∑
j∈[p]
I(Xi,j ; Πi | X<ji ,Σ−i,Φi)
(by Proposition 2.5 as Xi,j ⊥ X<ji | Σ−i,Φi)
=
1
p
· I(Xi ; Πi | Σ−i,Φi) ≤ 1
p
·H(Πi | Σ−i,Φi) ≤ 1
p
·H(Πi) ≤ 1
p
· |Πi|
where the equality in the second line is by chain rule (Fact 2.3-(4)), and inequalities are by Fact 2.3-
(1) and Fact 2.3-(3).
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We can now conclude the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Communication cost of π is Ω(p).
Proof. ‖π‖ =∑i∈N |Πi| ≥ p ·∑i∈N I(Θ ;Πi | Σ, J) ≥ p · I(Θ ;Π | Σ, J) = Ω(p). where the last three
equations are by, respectively, Lemma 3.7, Claim 3.6, and Claim 3.5.
Theorem 1 now follows from Lemma 3.8 by re-parameterizing ε above by some Θ(ε) and noting
that p = exp (Θ(kε)) = exp
(
mΩ(ε)
)
(as m = k3).
4 Main Result: A Lower Bound for Multi-Round Protocols
In this section, we establish our main result. Formally,
Theorem 2. For any integer 1 ≤ r ≤ o
(
logm
log logm
)
, and any sufficiently small constant ε > 0, any r-
round protocol (possibly randomized) for combinatorial auctions with subadditive (even XOS) bidders
that can approximate the value of social welfare to a factor of
(
1
r ·m
1−ε
2r+1
)
requires exp
(
mΩ(
ε
r
)
)
bits
of communication.
We start by introducing the recursive family of hard input distributions that we use proving in
Theorem 2 and then establish a lower bound for this distribution.
4.1 A Hard Input Distribution for r-Round Protocols
Our hard distribution Dr for r-round protocols is defined recursively with its base case (r = 1 case)
being the distribution D1 introduced in Section 3.1. We first give an informal description of Dr.
Let k be an integer and consider a set N of nr = k
2r players and a set M of mr = (r+1) ·k2r+1
items. The players are partitioned (arbitrary) between k2 groups N1, . . . , Nk2 each of size nr−1. Fix
a group Ng and for any player i ∈ Ng, we create an exponentially large (in k) collection Ci of item-
sets of size mr−1 (over the universe M), such that the for any two sets S, T ∈ Ci, |S ∩ T | ≤ k2r−2+ε
(for any constant ε > 0).
The local view of player i ∈ Ng is as follows: over each set Sj ∈ Ci, we create an (r − 1)-round
instance of the problem, namely instance Ii,j, sampled from the distribution Dr−1 with the set of
players being Ng and the set of items being Sj, and then let the input of player i be the collective
input of the i-th player in all these instances. In other words, player i finds herself “playing” in
exponentially many “(r − 1)-round instances” of Dr−1.
On the group level, the input to players inside a group Ng are highly correlated: for each player
i ∈ Ng, one of the instances, namely Ii,j⋆, is an “special instance” in the sense that all players in
the group Ng has a “consistent” view of this instance, i.e., the collective view of players 1, . . . , nr−1
in Ng on the instances I1,j⋆ , . . . , Inr−1,j⋆ forms a valid instance sampled from Dr−1. However, for
any other index j 6= j⋆, the collective view of players in Ng in the instances I1,j⋆, . . . , Inr−1,j⋆ forms
a “pseudo instance” that is not sampled from Dr−1; these pseudo instances are created by sampling
the input of each player independently according to Dr−1. Note however that while the pseudo
instances and the special instance of a player are fundamentally different, each player is oblivious
to this difference, i.e., which instance is the special instance.
Finally, the input to players across the groups, i.e., the global input, is further correlated: the
set of items in the special instances of players in a group Ng is a “unique” set of items (across
all groups), while all other instances, across all groups, are constructed over a set of k2r “shared”
items. This correlation makes the special instance of a player i, in some sense, the only important
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instance: to obtain a large allocation, the players need to ultimately solve the problem for these
special instances.
We now formally define distribution Dr. In the following, for simplicity of exposition, we assume
that the distribution Dr, in addition to the valuation function of players, also outputs the private
collections (defined similarly as in D1) of players that are used to define these functions4.
Distribution Dr(N,M). A hard input distribution for r-round protocols (for r ≥ 2).
Input: Collections N of nr = k
2r players and M of mr = (r + 1) · k2r+1 items.
Output: A set of nr valuation functions (v1, . . . , vnr) for the players in N and nr private collec-
tions (F1, . . . ,Fnr ) used to define the valuation functions.
1. Let Sr = {S1, . . . , Sp} be a (pr, qr, tr, ℓr)-intersecting family with parameters pr = p =
exp (Θ(kε)), qr = k
2r + r · k2r−1, tr = r · k2r−1, and ℓr = k2r−2+ε (guaranteed to exist by
Lemma 2.2 as k = mΩ(1/r) = ω(r2/ε) by the assumption that r = o
(
logm
log logm
)
).
2. Arbitrary group the players into k2 groups N = (N1, . . . , Nk2), whereby each group contains
exactly nr−1 = k
2r−2 players.
3. Pick an index j⋆ ∈ [p] uniformly at random and sample an instance I⋆r ∼ Dr−1([nr−1], Sj⋆).
4. For each group Ng ∈ N independently,
(a) Define I⋆Ng as I
⋆
r by mapping the players in [nr−1] to Ng.
(b) For each player i ∈ Ng independently, create p instances I(i) := (Ii,1, . . . , Ii,p) whereby
for all j 6= j⋆, Ii,j ∼ Dr−1(Ng, Sj), and Ii,j⋆ = I⋆Ng .
(c) For a player i ∈ Ng and index j ∈ [p], let Fi,j be the set of private collection of that
player in instance Ii,j and let Fi =
⋃
j∈[p]Fi,j .
5. Pick a random permutation σ of M . For each g ∈ [k2] and group Ng, map the k2r items
in [qr] \ Sj⋆ to σ(1), . . . , σ(k2r), and the tr items in Sj⋆ to σ((g − 1) · tr + 1) . . . σ(g · tr)
(and for each player i ∈ Ng, update the item set of Fi and underlying instances Ii,1, . . . , Ii,p
accordingly).
6. For any player i ∈ N , define the valuation function of player i as vi(S) = maxT∈Fi |S ∩ T |
(note that these valuation functions are XOS valuation; see Observation 3.1).
We make several observations about the distribution Dr. Recall that Fi denotes the private
collection of player i ∈ N that is used to define the valuation function vi. By construction, the size
of the sets inside each private collection is equal across any two distributions Dr and Dr′ and hence
is equal to k (by definition of distribution D1). A simple property of these sets is that,
Observation 4.1. For any player i ∈ N , and any set T ∈ Fi, the set T is chosen uniformly at
random from all k-subsets of M .
Fix any group Ng ∈ N and any player i ∈ Ng. The input to player i can be seen as the “view”
of i in the p instances I(i) := (Ii,1, . . . , Ii,p), i.e., the input of the i-th player (in Ng) in Ii,j (for all
4Strictly speaking, this is a redundant information as the valuation functions can uniquely determine the private
collections; however, we include this redundant output for the ease of presentation.
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j ∈ [p]) and not the whole instance. However, in the following, we slightly abuse the notation and
use Ii,j to also denote the view of player i in the instance Ii,j. Moreover, we point out that Ii,j is
defined over the set of items Sj; hence, the complete input to player i is the pair (I
(i), φi) where φi
is the labeling function to map the items in Sj to M (see also Observation 3.2).
For any player i ∈ N , we refer to the instance Ii,j⋆ of player i as the special instance of player
i, and to all other instances Ii,j for j 6= j⋆ as fooling instances.
Observation 4.2. For any group Ng ∈ N , the joint input of all players i ∈ Ng in their special
instances Ii,j⋆ form the instance I
⋆
Ng
that is sampled from the distribution Dr−1.
On the other hand, the fooling instances of players i ∈ Ng are sampled independently and hence
the joint distribution of the players on their instances Ii,j is not sampled from Dr−1. Nevertheless,
this difference is not evident to the player i.
Observation 4.3. For any player i ∈ N , conditioned on the input (I(i), φi) given to the player i,
the index j⋆ is chosen uniformly at random from [p].
Additionally,
Observation 4.4. The distribution of collection of instances I := (I(1), . . . , I(nr)) ∼ Dr | I⋆r , σ, j⋆
is a product distribution as instances in Line (4b) are sampled independently (except for instances
Ii,j⋆ = I
⋆
r which are already conditioned on above).
Another important property of the special instances in distribution Dr is that,
Observation 4.5. The special instances I⋆N1 , . . . , I
⋆
Nk2
are supported on disjoint set of items (ac-
cording to the mapping σ).
Notice that we can trace the special instances into a unique path I⋆r → I⋆r−1 → . . . → I⋆2 ,
whereby I⋆2 is sampled from the distribution D1. We use θ⋆ to denote the parameter θ (in D1) in the
instance I⋆2 in this path. The following lemma proves a key relation between θ
⋆ and social welfare
of the sampled instance.
Lemma 4.6. For any instance I ∼ Dr:
Pr
(
sw(I) ≥ k2r+1 | θ⋆ = 1) = 1 (1)
Pr
(
sw(I) ≤ 2r · k2r+2ε | θ⋆ = 0) = 1− r · exp (−Ω(kε)) (2)
Proof. We start by the simpler case of Eq (1); the proof is by induction. The base case, when r = 1,
is true by Lemma 3.4. Suppose this holds for all integers smaller than r. Now, consider an instance
I ∼ (Dr | θ⋆ = 1) and the k2 special instances IN1 , . . . , INk2 sampled from (Dr−1 | θ⋆ = 1) in I. By
induction, there is an allocation Ag for each g ∈ [k2] that results in a welfare of at least k2r−1 in
each I⋆Ng . By Observation 4.5, the set of items among special instances are disjoint, and hence the
allocation A := (A1, . . . , Ak2) which assigns the bundles in Ag to players in Ng for g ∈ [k2] is a valid
allocation that results in a welfare of k2 · k2r−1 = k2r+1, proving the induction step.
We now prove Eq (2) by induction. The base case of r = 1 is true by Lemma 3.4. Assume that
the bounds hold for all integers smaller than r and consider an instance I ∼ (Dr | θ⋆ = 0) and let
I⋆N1 , . . . , I
⋆
Nk2
be the special instances of I, “copied” from the instance I⋆r ∼ (Dr−1 | θ⋆ = 0) (as in
Line (4a) of Dr). Let U be the set of items assigned to these instances (by mapping σ) and U be
the set of remaining items assigned by σ, i.e., the items that have no value in the special instances;
we have |U | = k2 · tr = r · k2r+1 and
∣∣U ∣∣ = k2r (notice that σ does not assign all the items in M ;
in particular, k2r+1 − k2r items are not assigned to any instance, i.e., have no value for any player;
these extra items are only added to simplify the math.). We have,
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Claim 4.7. W.p. 1− exp (−Ω(kε)), for any player i ∈ N and any set T ∈ Fi such that T does not
belong to a private collection of a special instance (i.e., T is not sampled from Ii,j⋆), |T ∩ U | ≤ k2ε.
Proof. Fix a group Ng ∈ N and fix a player i ∈ Ng and let Ii,j be an instance of Dr−1 for some
j 6= j⋆, i.e., not a special instance. Recall that the set of items in Ii,j and Ii,j⋆ are two distinct
sets Sj and Sj⋆ from Sr on the universe [qr] (and hence |Sj ∩ Sj⋆| ≤ ℓr = k2r−2+ε by definition
of intersecting families), and since [qr] is entirely mapped by σ for player i ∈ Ng, the intersection
between item set of Ii,j and Ii,j⋆ is at most k
2r−2+ε; this in particular means that at most k2r−2+ε
items in Ii,j belong to U (Ii,j does not share any item with any instance Ii′,j⋆ for any i
′ /∈ Ng).
Now consider the choice of a set T (in the private collection) for the player i in the instance
Ii,j. For each item a that belongs to both item-set of Ii,j and U , define an indicator random
variable Xa ∈ {0, 1}, which is one iff a is chosen in T . Then, X :=
∑
aXa denotes |T ∩ U |. By
Observation 4.1, T is a k-subset chosen uniformly at random from a universe of size tr = r · k2r−1,
and hence, E [X] ≤ k2r−2+ε · 1/(r · k2r−2) ≤ kε/r. By Chernoff bound for negatively correlated
random variables (Proposition 2.1), Pr
(|S ∩ U | ≥ k2ε) ≤ exp (−Ω(k2ε)).
We can now apply a union bound for all possible choices for the set T (among all players and
instances), and the probability that even one set T violates this constraint is (note that there are
nr · pr different choices for T )
nr · pr · exp
(−Ω(k2ε)) = exp (Θ(r · log k)) · exp (Θ(r · kε)) · exp (−Ω(k2ε)) = exp (−Ω(kε))
since r = o(kε) (by the assumption that r = o
(
logm
log logm
)
).
In the following we condition on the event in Claim 4.7 (event E1) and the event that sw(I⋆) ≤
2(r − 1) · k2r−2+2ε (event E2). Note that by Claim 4.7 and induction hypothesis, these two events
happen (simultaneously) w.p. 1− r · exp (−Ω(kε)).
Now fix any allocation A = (A1, . . . , An). As size of U is at most k2r, the items in U can only
contribute k2r to the welfare in A. Next, let A∗ be the subset of A such that the maximizing
clause in each Ai ∈ A∗ (i.e., the set T ∈ Fi) belongs to some special instance, and A′ be the
remaining part of allocation A. We know, by E2, that the contribution of A∗ to the welfare is at
most k2 · 2(r− 1) · k2r−2+2ε = 2(r− 1) · k2r+2ε (counting the k2 special instances). Moreover, by E1
(in Claim 4.7), the contribution of A′ is at most k2r · k2ε = k2r+2ε. To conclude, we obtain that the
social welfare when θ⋆ = 0 is at most k2r + 2(r − 1) · k2r+2ε + k2r+2ε ≤ 2r · k2r+2ε with the desired
probability, proving the lemma.
4.2 The Lower Bound for Distribution Dr
Let π be a r-round protocol that can output a
(
1
r ·m
1−2ε
2r+1
r
)
-approximation to the social welfare of
any instance I ∼ Dr, w.p. of failure δ < 1/4. In this section, we prove that the communication cost
of the protocol π needs to be at least exp(Ω(kε)) bits. By (the easy direction of) Yao’s minimax
principle [29], it suffices to prove this lower bound for deterministic algorithms.
We start by providing a detailed overview of the proof. First, by Lemma 4.6 we can argue that
the protocol π is also a (δ + o(1))-error protocol for estimating the parameter θ⋆, and hence we
prove the lower bound for θ⋆-estimation problem instead. Recall that in any instance Ir ∼ Dr, the
value of θ⋆ is equal to the value of θ⋆ in the underlying special instance I⋆r in Ir, and that I
⋆
r is
sampled from the distribution Dr−1. Hence to “solve” the instance Ir ∼ Dr, the players need to
be able to solve the instance I⋆r ∼ Dr−1 as well. This suggests an inductive approach to prove the
lower bound for the distribution Dr.
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Consider the first message Π1 = (Π1,1, . . . ,Π1,nr) of π. Recall that the input to any player i ∈ N
consists of p different instances (of Dr−1), one of which being the instance I⋆r . By Observation 4.3,
each player i is oblivious to the identity of I⋆r and hence, intuitively, the message Π1,i cannot reveal
more than ≈ |Π1,i| /p bits of information about the instance I⋆r . Considering the simultaneity of the
protocol π, we can use a similar argument as in the previous section and prove that if |Π1| = o(p),
then at most o(1) bits of information is revealed about I⋆r .
Now consider the second round of the protocol π. The task of players in each group Ng ∈ N
is now to solve the instance I⋆r (on a separate set of players and items). As argued above, the first
message of players can only reveal o(1) bits of information about I⋆r and hence distribution of I
⋆
r is
still “very close” to its original distribution Dr−1, even conditioned on the first message of players.
But Dr−1 is assumed inductively to be a hard input distribution for (r−1)-round protocols and as π
needs to solve I⋆r in (r− 1) rounds now, we may argue that it needs an exponential communication.
To make this intuition precise, we employ a round-elimination argument: Given any hard in-
stance Ir−1 ∼ Dr−1, we “embed” Ir−1 in an r-round instance Ir sampled from Dr conditioned on
the first message Π1 of π with no communication between the players and then use π from the
second round onwards to solve Ir−1. However, notice that as the number of players (and items)
vary between Ir and Ir−1, we cannot directly apply π on Ir−1. Instead, the players first sample
a message Π1 (of π) according to the distribution Dr using public randomness. Next, each player
i ∈ [nr−1] in the instance Ir−1 mimics the role of k2 different players (one “copy” in each group in N
in Ir) by letting the input of each copy in the special instance (of Ir) be her input in Ir−1 and then
“completes” the rest of her input (i.e., her fooling instances in Ir) independently of other players
to obtain an instance Ir ∼ Dr | I⋆r = Ir−1,Π1. Note that a-priori it is not clear that why such an
embedding is possible since the first message Π1 correlates the input of players in fooling instances,
making independent sampling of these instances impossible. However, we show that by further
conditioning on some “easy part” of the input in the first round, i.e., σ and j⋆ (by sampling these
parts publicly also), the players can indeed implement this embedding without any communication
and hence obtain a valid (r − 1)-round protocol for Ir−1. We are now ready to present the formal
proof. To continue, we need the following notation.
Notation. For any j ∈ [r], we use Πj = (Πj,1, . . . ,Πj,nr) to denote the random variable for the
transcript of the messages communicated in the round j of π. For any player i ∈ N , and any
j ∈ [p], we override the notation and use Ii,j to also denote the random variable for the instance
Ii,j sampled in Dr (similarly for I⋆r and I(i)). We further use Σ to denote the random variable for
the permutation σ and J for the index j⋆. We start by the following simple claim.
Claim 4.8. Protocol π can also determine the value of θ⋆ w.p. 1− δ − o(1).
Proof. By Lemma 4.6, the ratio of sw(I) depending on the parameter θ⋆ is (w.p. 1− o(1)):
k2r+1
2r · k2r+2ε =
k1−2ε
2r
=
m
1−2ε
2r+1
r
2r · (r + 1) 12r+1
>
1
r
·m
1−2ε
2r+1
r
Hence, the δ-error
(
1
r ·m
1−2ε
2r+1
r
)
-approximation protocol π correctly determines the value of θ⋆ w.p.
1− δ − o(1).
We show that as long as the first message sent by the players is not too large, this message
cannot reveal much information about the special instance I⋆r embedded in the distribution Dr.
This argument is a similar to the one in Section 3.2.
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Lemma 4.9. If |Π1| = o(p/r4), then I(I⋆r ; Π1 | Σ, J) = o(1/r4).
We break the proof of Lemma 4.9 into two separate steps. First, we argue that the information
revealed by the first message about I⋆r is at most the total summation of the information revealed
by each individual player about I⋆r , after conditioning on the “easy part” of the input in the first
round, i.e., σ and j⋆.
The proof of this claim is essentially identical to that of Claim 3.6 and is provided for complete-
ness.
Claim 4.10. I(I⋆r ; Π1 | Σ, J) ≤
∑
i∈N I(I
⋆
r ; Π1,i | Σ, J).
Proof. We have,
I(I⋆r ; Π1 | Σ, J) =
∑
i∈N
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Π<i1 ,Σ, J) ≤
∑
i∈N
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | R,Σ, J)
where the equality is by chain rule (Fact 2.3-(4)), and the inequality follows from Proposition 2.6, as
we prove below that Π1,i ⊥ Π<i1 | I⋆r ,Σ, J or equivalently I(Π1,i ; Π<i1 | I⋆r ,Σ, J) = 0 (by Fact 2.3-(2)).
Define I := (I(1), . . . , I(nr)). As stated in Observation 4.4, we have Ii ⊥ I<i | I⋆r ,Σ, J and
hence I(Ii ;I<i | I⋆r ,Σ, J) = 0 (by Fact 2.3-(2)). Moreover, notice that for any player i ∈ N , Π1,i
is a deterministic function of I(i),Σ, J and hence, conditioned on I⋆r ,Σ, J , message Π1,i is only a
function of Ii = I(i). Consequently, by data processing inequality (Fact 2.3-(5)), we also have
I(Π1,i ; Π
<i
1 | I⋆r ,Σ, J) = 0.
In the next step, we use a direct-sum style argument to show that,
Lemma 4.11. For any i ∈ N , I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J) ≤ |Π1,i|/p.
Proof. We have,
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J) = E
j∈[p]
[
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J = j)
]
= E
j∈[p]
[
I(Ii,j ; Π1,i | Σ, J = j)
]
(I⋆r = Ii,j conditioned on J = j)
=
1
p
·
p∑
j=1
I(Ii,j ; Π1,i | Σ, J = j)
(the index j⋆ is chosen uniformly at random from [p])
Define Σ−i as the part of permutation Σ that does not affect the labeling function Φi of player
i, i.e., the values that are not used to map the the input of player i (and all players in the same
group as i) to M . With this notation, Σ can be written as a function of Φi, Σ
−i, and J (as J and
Φi uniquely define the rest of Σ outside Σ
−i). Consequently, we can write,
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J) =
1
p
·
p∑
j=1
I(Ii,j ; Π1,i | Σ−i,Φi, J = j)
Our goal is now to drop the conditioning on the event “J = j”. To do so, notice that the
distribution of (Σ−i,Φi) is independent of the event J = j; this is immediate to see as Σ
−i is
independent of Φi and J = j, and Φi is independent of J = j by Observation 4.3. Moreover, Ii,j is
independent of all (Σ−i,Φi, J = j) as it is chosen independently from Dr−1 and furthermore, Π1,i
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is a function of Φi, I
(i), which are independent of J = j (again by Observation 4.3). Consequently,
we can drop the conditioning in the above equation and obtain that,
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J) =
1
p
·
p∑
j=1
I(Ii,j ; Π1,i | Σ−i,Φi)
≤ 1
p
·
p∑
j=1
I(Ii,j ; Π1,i | I(i)<j ,Σ−i,Φi)
(by Proposition 2.5 as Ii,j ⊥ I(i)<j | Σ−i,Φi)
=
1
p
· I(I(i) ; Π1,i | Σ−i,Φi) ≤ H(Π1,i)/p ≤ |Π1,i| /p
where the equality is by chain rule (Fact 2.3-(4)) and final inequality is by Fact 2.3-(1).
We now have,
Proof of Lemma 4.9. By Claim 4.10, and Lemma 4.11,
I(I⋆r ; Π1 | Σ, J) ≤
∑
i∈N
I(I⋆r ; Π1,i | Σ, J) ≤
∑
i∈N
|Π1,i| /p = |Π1| /p = o(1/r4)
by the lemma assumption that |Π1| = o(p/r4).
Recall that I⋆r is the special instance in distribution Dr which was sampled from distribution
Dr−1. We define ψr as the distribution of I⋆r conditioned on (Π1,Σ, J), i.e., after seeing the first
message of π and the easy part of the input (Σ, J). As a corollary of Lemma 4.9, we have that this
further conditioning does not change the distribution of I⋆r by much.
Claim 4.12. If |Πr| = o(p/r4), then, E(Π1,Σ,J)
[
‖ψr −Dr−1‖
]
= o(1/r2).
Proof. We have,
E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
‖ψr −Dr−1‖
]
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
‖ψr − dist(I⋆r | (Σ, J))‖
]
(dist(I⋆r ) = Dr−1 and I⋆r ⊥ Σ, J)
≤ E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[√1
2
· D(ψr || dist(I⋆r | (Σ, J)))
]
(by Pinsker’s inequality (Fact 2.8))
≤
√
1
2
· E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
D(ψr || dist(I⋆r | (Σ, J)))
]
(by concavity of
√· and Jensen’s inequality)
=
√
1
2
· I(I⋆r ; Π1 | Σ, J) (by Fact 2.7)
which is o(1/r2) by Lemma 4.9.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. Define the recursive function e(r) :=
e(r − 1) + o(1/r2) (with e(0) = 0). Note that e(r) =∑ri=1 o(1/i2) = o(1). We have,
Lemma 4.13. For any r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol π for determining θ⋆ on Dr with error probability
at most δ = 1/3 − e(r) requires Ω(p/r4) communication.
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Proof. We prove this lemma inductively. The base case for r = 1 follows from Lemma 3.8. Now
suppose the result holds for all integers smaller than r and we aim to prove it for the case of r-
round protocols. Let π be a δ-error protocol for estimating θ⋆ with δ = 1/3 − e(r) and assume
by contradiction that the communication cost of π is o(p/r4); we use π to design a randomized
(r−1)-round protocol π′ that has communication cost o(p/r4), and errs w.p. at most 1/3−e(r−1)
on Dr−1, and then use averaging argument to fix its randomness to obtain a deterministic protocol
that contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Protocol π′: An (r − 1)-round protocol for solving instances of Dr−1 using protocol π.
Input: An instance I ∼ Dr−1. Output: The value of θ⋆ in I.
1. Let N = [nr] and M = [mr].
2. Using public randomness, the players sample (Π1, σ, j
⋆) ∼ Dr(N,M), i.e., they sample from
the joint distribution of the first message of π (denoted by Π1), the permutation σ over M ,
and the index j⋆ ∈ [p].
3. The players partition N into k2 equal-size groups N = (N1, . . . , Nk2) (as is done in Dr) and
the i-th player (denoted by Pi) in I mimics the role of the i-th player in each group Ng ∈ N
(denoted by Pi,g) individually, as follows:
(a) Pi sets the input for Pi,g (for g ∈ [k2]) in the instance Ii,j⋆ (in Dr) as the input of Pi
in the input instance I mapped via σ to M (using the same procedure as in Dr).
(b) Pi samples the input for Pi,g (for g ∈ [k2]) in all other instances Ii,j (for j 6= j⋆), using
private randomness from the distribution Ii,j ∼ Dr | (I⋆ = I,Π1, σ, j⋆) (we prove this
is indeed possible by Proposition 4.14 below).
4. The players run the protocol π on the new sampled instance conditioned on the first message
being Π1, (i.e., run π from the second round assuming Π1 is the content of blackboard after
the first round) and output the same answer as π.
We start by arguing that π′ is indeed a valid protocol; in particular, Line (3b) can be implemented
without any communication. We first need some new notation. For any player i ∈ N , define I⋆r (i) as
the input of player i in the instance Ii,j⋆ = I
⋆
r (conditioned on Σ, J), and define I
⋆
r (−i) as the input
of all other players in I⋆r . To prove that π
′ is valid, it suffices to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.14. The distribution I := (I(1), . . . , I(n)) ∼ (Dr | I⋆r ,Π1,Σ, J) is a product distri-
bution whereby each Ii = I(i) is sampled from Dr | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J .
Proof. For any i ∈ N , we prove that I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) = 0. By Fact 2.3-(2), this
implies that Ii ⊥ (I−i, I⋆r (−i)) | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J , hence proving the proposition. We have,
I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) = I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,i,Π−i1 ,Σ, J) (as Π1 = Π1,i,Π−i1 )
≤ I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,i,Σ, J)
since Ii ⊥ Π−i1 | (I−i, I⋆r = (I⋆r (i), I⋆r (−i)) ,Π1,i,Σ, J) asΠ−i1 is a deterministic function of I−i, I⋆r ,Σ, J ,
and hence we can apply Proposition 2.6.
Furthermore,
I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) ≤ I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,i,Σ, J)
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≤ I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Σ, J)
since
(I−i, I⋆r (−i)) ⊥ Π1,i | Ii, I⋆r (i),Σ, J) as Π1,i is a deterministic function of I(i) = (Ii, I⋆r (i)),Σ, J
and hence we can again apply Proposition 2.6. Finally, I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Σ, J) = 0 by
Observation 4.4 and Fact 2.3-(2), implying that I(Ii ;I−i, I⋆r (−i) | I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) = 0 as well,
proving the proposition.
It is now easy to see that π′ is indeed an (r−1)-round protocol: to sample from the distribution
Dr | (I⋆ = I,Π1,Σ, J) in Line (3b), each player i ∈ N needs to sample from the distribution
Dr | (I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) (by Proposition 4.14), and this is possible since (I⋆r (i),Π1,Σ, J) are all known
to i. Hence, the players do not need any communication for simulating the first round of protocol
π. We now prove that.
Claim 4.15. π′ is a δ′-error protocol for Dr−1 for δ′ = 1/3 − e(r − 1).
Proof. Note that our goal is to calculate the probability that π′ errs given an instance I ∼ Dr−1.
For the sake of analysis, suppose that I ∼ ψr instead, i.e., is sampled from the distribution dist(I⋆r |
Π1,Σ, J) (according to distribution Dr). In this case, one can see that the distribution of the r-
round instance constructed by π′ matches the distribution Dr. Since π′ outputs the same answer
as π on this new sampled instance, and since I = I⋆r in the new instance, the probability that π
′
errs on ψr is equal to the probability that π errs on Dr which in turn is equal to 1/3 − e(r). Now
notice that by Claim 4.12, the total variation distance between ψr and Dr−1 is o(1/r2) and hence
by Fact 2.9, PrDr−1 (π
′ errs) ≤ Prψr (π′ errs) + o(1/r2) = 1/3− e(r − 1).
We now formalize the above intuition. Define Rpri and Rpub as, respectively, the private and
the public randomness of protocol π′. The probability that π′ errs on an instance I ∼ Dr−1 can be
written as,
Pr
Dr−1
(
π′ errs
)
= E
I∼Dr−1
E
Rpub
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Rpub
) ]
= E
Rpub
E
I∼Dr−1|Rpub
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Rpub
) ]
(as Rpub ⊥ I)
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
E
I∼Dr−1|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Π1,Σ, J
) ]
(as Rpub = (Π1,Σ, J))
≤ E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
E
I∼ψi|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Π1,Σ, J
) ]
+ ‖Dr−1 − (ψi | (Π1,Σ, J)) ‖
]
(by Fact 2.9)
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
E
I∼ψi|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Π1,Σ, J
) ]]
+ E
[
‖Dr−1 − ψi‖
]
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
E
I∼ψi|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Rpri
(
π′ errs | Π1,Σ, J
) ]]
+ o(1/r2) (by Claim 4.12)
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
E
I∼ψi|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Dr
(
π′ errs | I⋆r = I,Π1,Σ, J
) ]]
+ o(1/r2)
(the distribution of sampled instances in π′ (via Rpri) matches Dr | I⋆ = I,Π1,Σ, J)
= E
(Π1,Σ,J)
[
E
I∼ψi|(Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Dr
(π errs | I⋆r = I,Π1,Σ, J)
]]
+ o(1/r2)
(the output of π′ and π is the same)
= E
(I⋆r ,Π1,Σ,J)
[
Pr
Dr
(π errs | I⋆r ,Π1,Σ, J)
]
+ o(1/r2)
(ψi = dist(I
⋆
r | Π1,Σ, J) by definition)
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= Pr
Dr
(π errs) + o(1/r2) = 1/3 − e(r) + o(1/r2) = 1/3 − e(r − 1)
finalizing the proof.
Lemma 4.13 now follows from Claim 4.15 by an averaging argument since we can fix the ran-
domness in π′ to obtain a deterministic protocol π′′ that uses o(p/r4) bits of communication and
errs w.p. at most 1/3 − e(r − 1) on Dr−1, a contradiction with the induction hypothesis.
Theorem 2 now easily follows from Lemma 4.13.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let π be a
(
1
r ·m
1−2ε
2r+1
)
-approximation, (1/4)-error protocol for subadditive
combinatorial auctions on the distribution Dr. By Claim 4.8, π is also a (1/4 + o(1))-error protocol
for θ⋆ estimation on Dr. Since (1/4 + o(1)) < 1/3−e(r), by Lemma 4.13, we have ‖π‖ = Ω(p/r4) =
exp (Θ(kε)) /r4 = exp
(
mΩ(ε/r)
)
/r4 = exp
(
mΩ(ε/r)
)
, as k = mΩ(1/r) and r = o( logmlog logm). Re-
parametrizing ε by ε/2 in the lower bound argument finalizes the proof.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the role of interaction in obtaining efficient allocations in subadditive
combinatorial auctions. We showed that for any r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol that uses polynomial
communication can only achieve an Ω(1r ·m1/2r+1) approximation to the optimal social welfare. This
settles an open question posed by Dobzinski et al. [9] and Alon et al. [2] on the round-approximation
tradeoff of polynomial communication protocols in subadditive combinatorial auctions.
An immediate corollary of our main result is that Ω( logmlog logm) rounds of interaction are necessary
for obtaining an efficient allocation with polynomial communication in subadditive combinatorial
auctions. The qualitative message of this theoretical result is that a modest amount of interaction
between individuals in a market is crucial for obtaining an efficient allocation. This further support
the point of view of [9] on the necessity of interaction for economic efficiency.
An interesting direction for future research, also advocated by [9], is to consider the case where
the bidders valuations are submodular. It is known that obtaining a better than (1 − 1/2e)-
approximation to social welfare in submodular combinatorial auctions requires exponential com-
munication [12] (regardless of the number of rounds of interaction). However, no better lower
bounds are known for bounded-round protocols (even for simultaneous ones). Another interesting
open problem is to close the gap between the Ω(log log n) lower bound of [2] and the O(log n) up-
per bound of [9] on the number of rounds necessary to achieve an efficient allocation in matching
markets.
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